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French participation in the Euro Area is to be seen principally as a self-imposed 
‘semi-sovereignty game’. From the creation of the European Monetary System 
(EMS) in 1979, French political leaders have seen a European monetary 
constraint as a tool to reinforce domestic economic restructuring. In this sense, 
President François Mitterrand’s March 1983 decision to keep the franc in the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) represented the final decision to end socialist 
reflation, embrace market integration in the EC, and conform largely to the 
German economic standard. Yet the French pursuit of Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) and the policies of various French governments on EMU reform 
since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991 must also be seen in 
terms of loosening the external constraint on French monetary and fiscal policies. 
The tightness of this constraint was blamed for a serious decline in French 
economic output and rise in French unemployment, particularly in the period 
following German reunification in 1990. The operation of the EMS resulted in 
French policy makers having to follow German monetary and fiscal policies or 
risk speculation against the franc. EMU was thus supported because it eliminated 
both the need to follow German monetary policy and speculative pressures against 
the currency. The fiscal policy constraints of the convergence criteria of the 
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Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (Stability Pact) have still 
allowed considerable government margin of manoeuvre which has been used by 
French governments struggling with low economic growth since 2001. Yet at the 
same time, the return to relatively high real interest rates in France—albeit still far 
below those under the ERM—undermines the claim that the move to EMU would 
result in a more accommodating monetary policy than under the EMS. It thus 
appears that France suffers from its position as one of the lowest inflation 
countries in the Euro Area: in third place below only the Netherlands and Finland 
in the first half of 2007 and at 1.4 per cent significantly below the Euro Area 
average of 1.8. 
The first section of this chapter briefly explores the context and initial 
conditions of EMU in France. The pursuit of low inflation through the external 
constraint of the EMS and then EMU reflected real economic needs linked to 
developments in French capitalism and notably financial market liberalization. 
The discursive/ideological structure underpinning and shaping the impact of EMU 
involved a dialect between a conservative liberalism—in the ascendant given the 
economic constraints reinforced by monetary integration—and a rearguard 
interventionism that is bolstered by widespread public hostility to economic 
liberalism and globalization. The decision to embrace EMU should furthermore 
be seen in terms of French strategy to increase monetary policy-making power in 
relation to both the Germans and the Americans (Howarth 2001) which is not 
explored further in this chapter because it is of limited significance to the politics 
of EMU in post-1999 France. 
The second, third and fourth sections examine substantive reforms to, 
respectively, the French polity, politics and policies both in terms of this dialectic 
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between conservative liberalism and interventionism but also in terms of 
Europeanization. EMU embodies a paradox for French policy makers. The project 
can be seen in terms of meeting long-standing French macro-economic goals of 
achieving competitiveness through disinflation, the elimination of the German-
centred EMS and sheltering France from speculative pressures. Yet the EMU also 
involves an institutional framework and rules that ostensibly decrease policy 
making margin of manoeuvre. The third and fourth sections of this chapter are, in 
effect, studies of the French political management of this paradox. 
 
1. The Context: Reforming French Capitalism and Competitiveness as 
Justification  
 
The decline of French State-led capitalism and EMU.  
The operation of the EMS and the move to EMU coincided with processes of 
liberalization, privatization and budgetary restraint in France, developments that 
have contributed to the decline of the State-led model of capitalism. Yet the EMS 
and EMU are only in very small part responsible for this decline—through ‘top 
down’ Europeanization. Indeed, linking this change to European market 
integration more broadly is open to challenge (Schmidt 2002). Rather, French 
interest in monetary integration was reinforced by the perceived need to reform 
French capitalism. Initially, President Giscard d’Estaing saw in the EMS a 
mechanism to contain the inherently inflationary effects of the circuits de trésor 
system, in which French businesses depended principally upon state-allocated 
credit. Subsequently, the deflationary effects of the EMS supported the drive to 
reform the ‘overdraft’ economy (Mamou 1987; Loriaux 1991) through financial 
market liberalization started in 1984 by Pierre Bérégovoy as Minister of Finance 
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with the creation of the MATIF (the French futures market). Financial market 
liberalization was encouraged by EMS membership—the search for non-
inflationary sources of finance. Liberalization also reinforced continued EMS 
membership because it increased the need for monetary stability to attract foreign 
capital. The challenge of controlling inflation also provided a useful logic that 
helped overcome the institutionally-rooted reluctance to accept financial 
liberalization in the Treasury, which had blocked previous reform attempts 
(Loriaux 1991).  
Financial market liberalization in turn reinforced the ERM constraint and 
increased the logic of moving to EMU. The limited development of French 
institutional investors resulted in the rapid growth of French dependence on 
foreign-held—largely American-held—debt, which amounted to roughly 40 per 
cent of total debt by the early 1990s, far higher than any of the larger EU member 
states. In consequence, French governments had to be particularly cautious about 
the perceived strength of the franc and attractiveness of French interest rates 
(Reland 1998). Liberalization created new controlling interests—American 
pension funds—which increased the importance of shareholder value and 
discouraged interventionist strategies that were inconsistent with this value. 
Increased reliance on foreign capital reinforced the interest of the large-scale 
(principally CAC-40) business constituency in the ‘sound money’ goals of the 
EMS and EMU. Foreign capital needs and the desire to build Paris as a financial 
centre also undermined the economic logic underpinning French capital controls. 
In consequence, France had less to lose from capital liberalization, which the 
German government had established as a precondition for discussions on EMU. 
The pursuit of low inflation in France—principally to achieve national 
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competitive advantage—has also been closely connected to support for monetary 
integration. The apparent success of the policy of ‘competitive disinflation’—
measured in terms of the record French trade surplus during the second half of the 
1990s and impressive productivity gains in many French companies—helped 
bolster support for EMU amongst policy makers despite the perceived price of 
high unemployment and slower economic growth. Support has been potentially 
undermined by the return to French commercial and current account deficits from 
2003 (24 billion euros in 2005, a level not attained since 1982) combined with 
several years of poor economic growth below the Euro Area average and well 
below the EU-25 average, and persistently high-levels of unemployment hovering 
just below the 10 per cent figure. 
 
Reinforcing the Conservative Liberal Agenda 
The French politics of EMU is shaped by the dialectic between ‘conservative 
liberalism’ in the ascendance and a rear-guard interventionism, expected by 
French public opinion. Conservative liberalism is a label that describes the 
dominant economic ideology in the Treasury division of the Ministry of Finance, 
the Bank of France, and the Financial Inspectorate, the grand corps which forms 
the leading part of the French financial administrative elite. The influence of this 
ideological framework has always been limited by its fragmentation and weakness 
in French party politics (Dyson, Featherstone, and Michaelopoulos 1994: 35; 
Hazareesingh 1994). The creation of the EMS in 1979 corresponded to the 
hitherto rare predominance of conservative liberalism in government under Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing as President and Raymond Barre as Prime Minister.  
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This ideological framework was inspired more by the German model of 
low inflationary economic growth than Anglo-American liberalism (Dyson 1994; 
McNamara 1998). Neo-liberalism has few adherents in either political or policy 
making circles in France. Anglo-American economic arguments opposed to both 
the EMS and the EMU project had little presence in national debates on monetary 
integration (Rosa 1998)—even if many of the economic reforms adopted since the 
1980s, such as privatisation, can be described as neo-liberal. The term 
‘conservative liberalism’ is not one that these officials have applied to themselves 
nor is it used by academic or journalist observers in France. However, the term is 
of explanatory use. Conservative liberals uphold the self-adjusting nature of 
market mechanisms and reject state-led reflation. They also seek exchange-rate 
stability, low inflation, balanced budgets, and current account surpluses—none of 
which are liberal economic goals per se. Conservative liberals embraced the EMS 
and EMU as useful means to import German ‘sound’ money policies and budget 
and wage discipline. Core conservative liberal economic ideas formed the bedrock 
of ‘competitive disinflation’, the major French macroeconomic policy from the 
mid-1980s (Fitoussi 1992; 1995). The value of ‘sound’ money was linked to the 
idea that the weakening competitive position of French exports was due to 
structural problems that could not be resolved through competitive devaluations. 
Finally, conservative liberals respect technical expertise in economic policy and 
the maintenance of a measure of autonomy from political interference in the 
formulation and implementation of economic policy—which serves the interests 
of the Treasury and the Bank of France. EMU reinforced conservative liberalism 
through the convergence criteria and the transfer of monetary policy to 
technocratic control in the Bank of France and the ECB.  
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In decline since the 1960s with the opening of the French economy to 
international markets, dirigiste strategies have been restricted in the context of the 
operation of the EMS and the EMU project. Dirigisme reflects a strong mistrust of 
market mechanisms, the economic utility of which is nonetheless accepted. It 
insists on the need for active state intervention in the economy, labelled 
volontarisme. Dirigisme has influenced a wide spectrum of French political and 
public opinion to different degrees, notably the Gaullist/neo-Gaullist parties on 
the right, the Socialist Party on the left, in addition to the elite technical corps of 
the French state. Dirigistes tend to prefer the conservative liberal goals of a strong 
currency, monetary stability and a trade surplus, although normally for different 
reasons. But these goals are secondary to state-led economic growth. Dirigistes 
also seek to place constraints on the operation of international financial markets 
and speculative capital. 
In the 1980s and 1990s both the neo-Gaullists and the Socialists rejected 
many elements of dirigisme. At the same time electoral constraints—the public 
sanctioning of perceived excessive liberalism and expectation of robust state 
interventionism—forced both parties to continue to emphasize state-led action. 
There have been active government responses to the challenges of 
‘modernization’ in industrial, social and employment policies. The idea of 
regulating and controlling markets in the context of what Prime Minister Jospin 
labelled a ‘modern socialism’ was an important element of Socialist Party 
discourse in dealing with the constraints of globalization (Jospin 1999; Marian 
1999; Cambadélis 1999). Even conservative liberals like Edouard Balladur, 
Edmond Alphandéry, and Alain Juppé have made a spirited defence of French 
public services against European competition rules. Since 2002, centre-right UMP 
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governments have intervened in a range of areas, under the banner of ‘economic 
patriotism’, blocking foreign take-overs of French companies, insisting on the 
need to restrict foreign ownership in a range of economic sectors, providing state 
subsidies illegal under EU competition rules and foot-dragging on the 
privatization of state-owned gas and electricity firms and the liberalization of the 
energy sector required by EU-level agreements. 
 
2. EMU and French State Reform 
 
Adjusting to Independent Monetary Authority 
In terms of polity reform, the EMU project functioned as ‘top-down’ 
Europeanization. Its role as an independent variable was seen in the imposition of 
central bank independence, sought by few French policy-makers and politicians, 
and opposed by many. Compared with other central banks, the Bank of France 
was normally considered to be one of the more ‘dependent’, with monetary power 
concentrated in the Finance Ministry (Goodman 1992) and efforts to increase 
central bank autonomy were blocked. The conservative liberal admiration of the 
‘German model’ did not necessarily extend to support for central bank 
independence (Howarth 2001). The rapid move to independence in 1994—the 
start of Stage Two of EMU—was justified in terms of building confidence in the 
franc in the context of record levels of speculation and the possibility of a rapid 
move to Stage Three, not the desirability of independence per se. 
From 1994, the Bank of France had to accommodate itself to a more active 
and public role in promoting ‘stability’ culture in France. Jean-Claude Trichet, the 
first governor of the independent Bank of France, made several thinly veiled 
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attacks on presidential and government economic and monetary policy statements 
and economic policy decisions which appeared to menace the pursuit of ‘sound’ 
money policies, the move to EMU, and respect for the Stability Pact (Aeschimann 
and Riché 1996; Milesi 1998). The very public role of the Bank was short-lived. 
Since the start of EMU’s Stage Three, there has been a significant cut to the 
Bank’s staff total and closure of two-thirds of its branches in France. In 2006, its 
Monetary Policy Committee was replaced by a smaller Monetary Council. The 
Bank has failed to strengthen its position as an independent source of economic 
expertise. Efforts by supportive politicians and elements of the administration to 
increase the Bank’s role in banking supervision and competition in the financial 
sector have not yet been successful. 
As an independent variable, EMU was a catalyst for several reforms 
directly affecting the powers of the Treasury division of the Ministry of Finance. 
The Treasury’s loss of control over monetary policy contributed to the decline in 
its power caused by financial market liberalization, privatization and the 
imposition of European competition rules. Yet, the influence of the Treasury in 
the context of domestic policy-making has increased, consequent on reinforced 
EU-level surveillance of fiscal policies, the medium-term stabilization plans 
required by the Stability Pact and through the Lisbon process which have largely 
corresponded to conservative liberal reform priorities. With persistently high 
French public spending deficits and the repeated failure to meet medium-term 
targets, the Ministry of Finance plays the central galvanising role in governments’ 
efforts to contain state spending—leading, for example, the annual conference on 
the national budget that was launched in 2005 by Thierry Breton, the Minister of 
Finance. 
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3. The French Politics of EMU 
We can apply Radaelli’s (2000) analytical framework which examines 
Europeanization in terms of the scope of domestic change to the politics of EMU 
in France and several domestic policy sectors. This framework includes the 
concepts of transformation, accommodation, absorption, retrenchment (‘negative’ 
change) and inertia (resistance) (see also Heritier et a l. 2001; Cowles, Caporaso 
and Risse 2001). The possibility of retrenchment was strongest between 1992 and 
1996, when record high real interest rates, sluggish economic growth, and rising 
unemployment, combined with republican and nationalist opposition to EMU, 
made the government’s support for EMU problematic (Howarth 2001). Yet public 
opposition at the time was due principally to the perceived negative economic 
implications of EMS asymmetry and the EMU convergence criteria. Throughout 
this period, polls showed that a majority of French voters supported the core 
elements of EMU (see Table 1), and, unlike in some countries, the mainstream 
French press was on the whole supportive of EMU (Balleix-Banerjee 1999). The 
normally acquiescent business community began to turn against the ERM 
constraint from 1992, although the leading peak association of large-scale 
companies—the Conseil national du patronat français (CNPF) renamed from 
1998 the Mouvement des enterprises de France (MEDEF)—continued to support 
EMU (Aeschimann and Riché 1996).  
Both the Centre-Left and Centre-Right were significantly divided over the 
desirability of the EMU project and all the political parties have sought to 
manipulate frustrations with EMU-linked constraints against opponents. No 
political party collapsed over the issue of monetary integration, despite the strong 
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opposition of Eurosceptics in the Gaullist Rally for the Republic (RPR), including 
the large majority of the party’s National Assembly deputies and leading members 
Philippe Séguin and Charles Pasqua. The surprise election victory of the Plural 
Left in 1997 created the threat of retrenchment but the promises of creating a 
more ‘social euro’ and an end to budget cutting proved to be only temporary. 
Since the start of EMU’s Stage Three, opposition to EMU in the Socialist left and 
the Gaullist right has dwindled to the extent that no leading members call for 
French withdrawal. Rather, frequent criticism has instead been directed at the 
design of EMU and ECB monetary policies (discussed below). The Socialist Party 
has justified its support for EMU along similar lines to its defence of the Single 
Market Programme from the mid-1980s: as a mechanism to make the economy 
more competitive while preserving the relatively generous French social security 
system and working conditions (les acquis sociaux). 
The EMU constraint was manipulated explicitly by the candidates and 
parties in the 1995 presidential and 1997 legislative elections. During the 2002 
presidential and legislative election campaigns, the principal economic policy 
differences between Chirac and Jospin and the UMP / Socialist Party camps had 
to do with tax and the European constraint (Howarth 2004). On the one hand, 
Chirac and the UMP played the more traditional tune of the Right promising 
significant cuts in taxes on income (a third in the life of the next government and 
five per cent immediately), corporate (to the EU average) and value added taxes 
(on CDs and the hotel sector). On the European constraint, Chirac and the UMP 
took a more ambiguous line: accepting the need for budgetary restraint and 
accepting the desirability of the goal of balanced budgets while refusing to 
commit to the balanced budget goal of 2004, to which the Jospin Government had 
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agreed. There was a marked element of rebellion in Chirac’s policy: challenging 
the constraints of the Stability Pact if these constraints made the fulfilment of his 
promises on tax cuts and government spending unrealistic. On the other hand—
and this has to be the most significant irony of the 2002 electoral campaign—
Jospin and the Socialists found themselves in the completely reverse position 
from where they had been in the Spring of 1997: defending the constraining rules 
of EMU and the Stability Pact and presenting themselves as more financially 
responsible than the conservative opposition.  
Between 1994 and the start of EMU’s Stage Three, French government 
and opposition leaders regularly used the Bank of France and notably its 
governor, Jean-Claude Trichet, as scapegoats. Once independent, the Bank was 
blamed for the high interest rates needed to keep the franc in the EMS. With the 
transfer of monetary policy to the ECB, the target of scapegoating shifted. Since 
the start of the economic down-turn in 2001, French political leaders—including 
presidents Chirac and Sarkozy—have engaged actively in attacking the ECB for 
being excessively hawkish in its singular pursuit of low inflation and have 
challenged both the goals and independence of the bank. Nicolas Sarkozy—as 
minister of finance, UMP presidential candidate and then president—has regularly 
criticised the ECB’s monetary policy calling for it to adopt a Federal Reserve-
style target that includes economic growth (Financial Times, 11.6.2004 ; Le 
Monde, 23.2.2007). was equally critical. Several leading French politicians—
including Chirac, Sarkozy, Prime Minister de Villepin and Ségolène Royal, the 
Socialist Party’s candidate in the 2007 presidential elections—have also made 
both veiled and direct attacks on the ECB’s goal-setting independence (see, for 
example, Le Monde 9, 19 and 22.12.2006). 
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An ambiguous public and the euro 
French public opinion on EMU and the EU has fluctuated markedly over the past 
fifteen years with virtually no correlation to levels of economic growth (a 
standard correlation of 0.073) (see Table 1). Broadly negative political discourse 
on the institutional framework of EMU and ECB monetary policy—the most 
consistently negative in any Euro Area member state—must contribute to 
negative perceptions. Yet, French support for EMU has also been amongst the 
highest in the Euro Area—with France consistently placed in fifth place in 
Eurobarometer polls in terms of net support (‘Is the euro globally positive for 
one’s country?’) with only Luxembourg, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands 
higher. Net support since 1999 has been, on average, higher than support prior to 
Stage Three and the percentage of those in favour of the euro has averaged at just 
below 73 per cent. Despite these findings, there are indications that the 
persistently mediocre levels of economic growth from 2001 have contributed to 
rising public concern about the impact of EMU and responses to more specific 
polling questions demonstrate more nuanced public opinion. In December 2003, a 
Sofres poll conducted for the centre left magazine, le Nouvel Observateur (no. 
2044, 8 January 2004) showed that a growing minority (over 40 per cent) were of 
the opinion that the introduction of the euro ‘was a bad thing’ for the country. Yet 
according to this poll, 45 and 50 per cent believed that the euro had a negative 
effect on, respectively the economy and employment, whilst 56 per cent felt that 
the euro had a negative effect on their own situation personally. Only 1 per cent 
thought that the euro was advantageous to French citizens, versus 52 per cent who 
thought that the financial markets were the main beneficiaries. A September 2006 
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Gallup Poll for the European Commission recorded that only 51 per cent of 
French people found the euro to be ‘broadly advantageous’ with 30.9 per cent 
saying that the inconveniences outweighed the gains (Gallup for the European 
Commission, Le Monde, 30.12.2006). In late 2006, two polls recorded majorities 
(52 per cent) of the opinion that the introduction of the euro ‘was a bad thing’ for 
‘France, economic growth, employment and them’  (TNS Sofres, Le Monde 
26.12.2006) with only 46 per cent finding it to ‘be a good thing’. The results 
follow four years of poor economic growth, suggesting that the legitimacy of the 
EMU is linked to its perceived economic output. Curiously, these findings run 
counter to the Eurobarometer polling that indicate consistently high public 
support for EMU. Poorer socio-economic categories were particularly negative on 
the impact of the euro. 
 
4. Policy Regime Reform 
Policy Regime Reform should be seen principally as ‘bottom-up’ 
Europeanization, in which the EMS and EMU have operated as intervening 
variables shaping the operation of the French state and French policies to achieve 
economic ‘modernization’ (Alphandéry 2000; Boissonnat 1998). Prior to 1999, 
the EMS constraint and the EMU project were used by successive governments to 
justify a range of reforms: budgetary, welfare state, administrative, labour market, 
and privatization. Yet, the extent to which EMU has itself brought about 
‘transformation’ in France—as argued by Schmidt (2002)—should be qualified. 
The ‘transformation’ disguises developments which have worked to increase 
government margin of manoeuvre rather than decrease it. Rather than restricting 
the macroeconomic framework in which French governments must operate, EMU 
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has in some respects decreased constraints on French governments. There is 
greater margin of manoeuvre in fiscal (and other macroeconomic policies) despite 
(or even because) of the Stability Pact. As EMU removes the possibility of 
speculation against national currencies, greater deficits are less problematic in the 
short-term for governments in the management of their macro-economic policies 
as they are effectively sheltered by the single currency. The Stability Pact—
created ostensibly to restrain the spending of profligate governments—in fact 
increased adjustment time for governments. The clearest manifestation of this 
margin of maneouvre is the persistently high French public sector deficits since 
the start of EMU (well above pre-1992 average) and the rise of national debt to 
record levels (see Table 2). When respecting the Maastricht Treaty’s fiscal policy 
rules became politically difficult from 1993, French governments tried to change 
them. After the start of EMU’s Stage Three, it became possible to flout and then 
change the rules (the March 2005 Stability Pact reform) to ensure continued 
margin of manoeuvre. Since the creation of the Stability Pact in 1997, no French 
governments have respected the medium term target of a budget that is balanced 
or in surplus. Thus ‘transformation’ in the realm of monetary policy has, at best, 
allowed for ‘accommodation’ and ‘absorption’ in fiscal and macro-economic 
policies and at worse ‘retrenchment’—higher budget deficits and debt load—and 
‘inertia’—failure to engage in structural reform. Yet the most politically difficult 
feature of the EMU project for French governments has been respecting the short 
and medium term fiscal policy goals of the Stability Pact. In 2005, the European 
Commission (2005) placed France in the category of EU member states with 
unsustainable public finances. Prior to the start of Stage Three, the justification of 
budget cutting by both conservative and left-wing governments involved a 
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reinvention of discourse appealing to the preoccupation with unemployment: a 
lower deficit could result in lower taxes which would result in job creation. For 
the left this reinvention was particularly challenging, with Finance Minister 
Dominique Strauss Kahn announcing that there was nothing ‘Socialist’ about 
public spending deficits. 
When politically convenient, French governments have deliberately 
sought to link policy reform to the pressures created by EMU. This connection 
was made most prominently in the 1994 Minc Report (Minc 1994) the most 
comprehensive package of public sector reform recommendations to date. EMU 
as a justification for reform was presented as the central message of Chirac’s 
public U-turn on economic policy on 26 October 1995, the Juppé Plan of the 
following November, and the shift in the Jospin government’s budget policy in 
the summer 1997. At the time of the 2002 elections, Prime Minister Jospin 
justified limited margin of manoeuvre in Socialist Party tax and spending policies 
in terms of Stability Pact rules. While the Raffarin Government was willing to 
break these rules, emphasising the general goal of debt reduction rather than 
specific rules, the de Villepin and Fillon governments raised debt-cutting to 
highest echelon of government priorities and renewed their commitment to the 
pact’s medium term goals. However, the ability of the Fillon government to 
respect French commitments remains to be seen. 
EMU as a justification for reform has run up against competing values. 
Ideologically inspired political opposition to reforms has combined with labour 
union opposition to modifications to social security regimes and the privatisation 
of public services which are seen as disadvantaging public-sector employees. The 
result has been some degree of inertia. The political difficulties of reform were 
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manifested in the widespread strikes and public demonstrations of December 
1995 over the Juppe Plan and of March 2006 over proposed labour market reform 
of the Contrat Premier Emploi (CPE) proposed by the de Villepin Government. 
President Sarkozy’s promise of a dramatic rupture with the past and far-reaching 
reform proposals must be juxtaposed with his preference for compromise with 
trade unions and the modesty of the policies adopted to date (the end of 2007). 
Public administration staff cuts—the non-replacement of retiring staff—have been 
recommended in diverse reports but consistently avoided or significantly watered 
down by governments with an eye on the unemployment figures. The French 
public sector spending as a percentage of GPD has been consistently one of the 
highest in the European Union (after Sweden and Denmark) and has risen over the 
past fifteen years when there has been a decline in most of the other EU member 
states (Table 3) and is forecast to reach the top position in 2007 at 53.2 per cent of 
GDP (European Commission 2007). The European Commission, the ECB and 
other Euro Area Member State governments have repeatedly criticised French 
governments for pursuing inadequate reform but to little avail and with limited 
impact on French public opinion. Recently, in September 2007, Trichet took the 
unusual step of appearing on French television in an hour-long interview to 
explain why French economic difficulties owed nothing to ECB monetary policies 
and everything to the inadequate economic policies of French governments 
(Financial Times 24.9.2007). 
Careful political management, increased emphasis on consultation, 
negotiation, the building of supportive coalitions, open debate, good relations 
with labour union leaders and gradualism have become core elements of 
government reform strategies (Marsh 1999). On social security reform, 
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government strategy has had to overcome a tradition of conflictual relations with 
the ‘social partners’ and in particular labour unions. In 1995, Prime Minister 
Juppé discovered the dangers of foregoing consultation on social security reform 
and relying on the historic necessity of EMU membership to push through 
changes. The Raffarin Government’s 2003 public sector pension reform was 
successful precisely because of the government’s engagement in strategic 
consultations and its ability to divide the unions (Schludi 2005). Likewise, 
President Sarkozy’s governance style centres upon engagement with a diverse 
range of groups. In addition to placing emphasis upon a dialogue with labour 
unions on reform proposals and compromise, the President has also co-opted 
leading political figures from the political left and centre into his government—a 
policy known as l’ouverture—in order to extend support for reform. 
French governments have also taken to soliciting expert (including 
academic) opinion to inform government economic and social reform proposals—
a practice of President de Gaulle. In 1997, Prime Minister Jospin created the 
Council for Economic Analysis (CAE) which, attached to the prime minister’s 
office, consists of top—mostly academic—economists who meet on a monthly 
basis to discuss matters chosen by the prime minister or other ministers in 
advance. The CAE’s public ruminations on reform—diverse views are 
published—are supposed to help legitimise policy positions taken by the 
government (interviews with CAE members; Victor 1999: 427). Reflecting a busy 
reform agenda, in September 2007, Prime Minister Francis Fillon requested the 
CAE to prepare six reports over the following six months. Successive 
governments have requested reports on social security reform from the Economic 
and Social Council (ESC)—the institution created after the Second World War to 
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organise the consultation of the social partners on government policy. Dominated 
by the social partners, ESC reports on social security reform are unlikely to 
conform to government objectives. Thus in 2000, Jospin created the Advisory 
Council on Pensions—which continues to exist—as a mechanism to solicit 
alternative reform proposals to those offered by the social partners in the ESC. In 
2006, Prime Minister de Villepin supplemented the CAE and the Advisory 
Council with the Centre for Strategic Analysis, a modest successor to the defunct 
General Planning Commission, which also engages in the frequent soliciting of 
expert opinion on public sector reform. In August 2007, President Sarkozy 
reinforced the president’s role in the consultations process by creating yet another 
advisory body, the ‘Commission for the liberation of French growth’. The 
Commission’s 43 top economists, business leaders, former ministers and others—
from France and beyond—are to advise the President on necessary economic and 
labour market reforms. Sarkozy appointed Jacques Attali, formerly a top adviser 
to President Mitterrand and the Socialist Party, to head the Commission. 
Improved budget management came on to the agenda as another example 
of ‘bottom up’ Europeanization. The Juppé centre-right government (1995-97) 
brought about institutional changes to extend some parliamentary (and thus 
government) control over the operation of the semi-autonomous social security 
budgets, controlled hitherto solely by the ‘social partners’—employers’ 
representatives and trade unions. Decrees were also adopted to reform hospital 
administration and to control more effectively medical practitioners’ standard 
consulting fees. In 1998, the Jospin Government introduced a medium term 
budgetary strategy based on the setting of a target for the cumulated increase in 
real government expenditure over a three-year period. In practice, real 
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expenditure was planned to increase more slowly than potential real GDP. The 
strategy was created to enhance the transparency of the budgetary framework and 
help form expectations. However, as it failed to lead to expected results and initial 
targets were missed by a large margin, attempts have been made to modify the 
strategy. 
The importance of debt reduction has come to take a leading position in 
UMP government discourse. Thierry Breton, Minister of Finance from February 
2005 to May 2007, called himself the ‘anti-debt’ crusader. In 2006, he introduced 
the annual national conference on public finance under his chairmanship and the 
presence of the Prime Minister, as a device to reinforce efforts to cut spending in 
government departments. Breton also held press conferences every quarter with 
the participation of all the central government department directors. The Balladur 
Government had commissioned the well-known French business leader, Alain 
Minc, to prepare a report (La France de l’an 2000) with high public profile that 
could then help to legitimise public sector reform through the guise of non-
administrative business expertise (Minc 1994). Thierry Breton similarly hired the 
services of Michel Pébereau, président de BNP Paribas, who chaired the 
commission which prepared a report on French debt (Pébereau 2005) which he 
presented to Prime Minister de Villepin in December 2005. In response, de 
Villepin presented a five year plan to reduce French debt to the 60 per cent 
threshold and meet the medium term goal of the Stability Pact by 2012. President 
Sarkozy claims to be personally engaged in the struggle to lower French debt. He 
attended the July 2007 meeting of the Eurogroup, promising to do everything he 
could to meet this medium term goal. 
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With the failure of the Jospin Government to make sufficiently large cuts 
to the budget, the economic slow-down from 2001 resulted in the rapid rise of the 
deficit towards the 3 per cent figure, exceeding this figure for four years in a row 
from 2002 before dropping below in 2006 (see Table 2). The Raffarin 
government’s prioritisation of tax cutting over deficit cutting in the context of an 
economic slow down did not help matters. In the meantime, French debt exceeded 
the 60 per cent figure in 2003, rising to 66.2 in 2005 before dropping in 2006. 
With the launch of the Early Warning and then Excessive Deficit procedures 
(EWP and EDP) against France and the stubborn refusal to move rapidly to cut 
the deficit, President Chirac and the Raffarin Government called for a temporary 
‘softening’ of the Stability Pact (Le Monde, 14.7.2003) and even a rethink on the 
Pact. Repeated German failure to meet the 3 per cent deficit figure from 2002 
gave the French greater political margin of manoeuvre on the Pact rules and the 
two countries demanded the suspension of the EDP at the 25 November 2003 
Ecofin meeting (Howarth 2007 ; Schwarzer 2007). 
The restriction of interest-rate and exchange-rate policies in the EMS and 
their loss with EMU, combined with the intensified wage competition in the Euro 
Area, has reinforced pressures on French governments to modify labour-market 
policies and increase wage flexibility: an example of ‘soft’ Europeanization. 
Governments have attempted to undertake reform in a context of high structural 
unemployment. The lack of centralized wage bargaining in France makes 
negotiated solutions to labour market rigidities more difficult. Conservative 
governments have sought to respond to these rigidities by relaxing rules on hiring. 
They have allowed greater scope for the creation of jobs of a limited duration—
contrats de durée déterminé, CDD—the non-enforcement of rules that standard 
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wages—as under contrats de durée indéterminé, CDI—apply to these jobs and the 
toleration of a significant increase in part-time work, not remunerated at SMIC 
(the minimum monthly wage). The de Villepin Government failed in its efforts 
through the CPE to extend existing provisions for limited duration contracts for 
younger workers from SMEs to all companies. This followed the failure over a 
decade earlier in 1994 of the Balladur Government to introduce a youth SMIC to 
address high youth unemployment. The Jospin government created the possibility 
for greater flexibility in the context of the 35-hour week policy. It allowed 
companies, in collective bargaining on the implementation of the 35-hour week, 
the possibility of freezing wages and spreading the calculation of the 35-hour 
week over the period of a year. President Sarkozy and the Fillon Government 
have sought to increase further the flexibility in the 35-hour week policy by 
adopting a law allowing companies to pay staff for supplementary hours without 
the imposition of income tax.  
French companies have taken full advantage of the fixed duration contract, 
35 hour week provisions and holes in French labour law to increase 
competitiveness in the context of the Single Market and EMU (see Hancké (2002) 
for an overview of firm-led adjustment in France). The percentage of full-time 
salaried workers on CDD rose from 1.4 per cent in 1983 to 10.8 per cent in 2000 
with considerably higher percentages for younger workers (Blanchard and 
Landier 2002; Insee 2007). The estimated percentage of part-time employees as a 
percentage of total salaried workers increased markedly in the period prior to 
EMU when French unemployment reached high levels, rising from 11.9 per cent 
of salaried workers in 1990 to just under 18 per cent in 2005. French temporary 
employment rates are similar to those in Germany but temporary rates fall well 
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behind those in Spain at about 30 per cent. Part-time rates fall below those in 
Germany (25.8 per cent in 2006) and well behind those in the Netherlands (46.2 
per cent in 2006) (Insee 2007). The 35 hour week policy has allowed company 
level negotiations to fit hours worked per week with business needs.  
 
The pursuit of EU-level ‘governance économique’  
All French governments since 1991 have placed emphasis on counter-balancing 
both the ‘sound’ money bias of EMU and the power of the ECB in the Euro Area 
by strengthening European ‘economic government’, and by reinforcing European 
social and employment policies. Yet the ostensible desire for tightened 
coordination (the implication at the supranational level of the interventionist 
legacy) is contradicted by consistent French insistence upon national margin of 
manoeuvre. Because of this contradiction, French policy makers have been unable 
to spell out very clearly what they mean by EU economic governance (Howarth 
2007) and their pronouncements on the subject take on a variety of meanings, 
from effective policy mix, to interventionism, to enhancing EMU and ECB 
credibility and legitimacy but also as direct challenge to ECB independence. For 
domestic political consumption, French governments have repeatedly exaggerated 
the importance of subsequent institutional and policy developments at the EU 
level to the process of constructing an economic government—the creation of the 
Euro-group, the informal intergovernmental gathering of Euro Area finance 
ministers and its reinforcement, the creation of the new Economic and Financial 
Committee (Libération, 13 January 1999), consisting of EU treasury and central 
bank officials, the Cologne Macro-Economic Dialogue and the Lisbon process 
more generally. 
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Regular French initiatives on interventionist EU strategies demonstrate the 
extent to which French governments, be they on the Right or the Left, still feel the 
need to call for deficit spending in order to stimulate the economy. Yet no such 
initiatives—principally infrastructural programme proposals—have actually 
resulted in EU-level agreements that involve significant spending on programmes. 
Some of these projects are presented as Franco-German joint initiatives. The 
Franco-German growth initiative of 18 September 2003 attacked the Commission 
for being excessive in its drive for budget cutting and ‘anti-industry’, pledging 
further tax cuts in both countries and 10 major jointly funded infrastructural 
projects (Le Monde, 19.9.2003). In April 2006, Chirac joined with Chancellor 
Merkel to launch a ‘Europe of grand projects’ which involved the allocation of 
€1.7 billion French funding. In June 2006, Chirac and Merkel announced 
additional joint projects to focus on areas such as education, research and energy 
policy. 
Economic government as expressed through the creation of a substantial 
EU employment policy and reinforced social policy was of particular importance 
for the Plural Left government as a reinforcement and legitimization of activist 
domestic employment policies. The Socialists have placed emphasis on the 
construction of ‘social democracy’ at the European level as a means to 
counterbalance the monetary power of the ECB and to ‘manage’ the effects of 
globalization (Jabko 2006). Prime Minister Jospin reached a compromise with the 
Germans that involved the creation of the employment chapter, the resolution on 
growth and employment, and the formulation of a European employment strategy. 
The resolution involved only vague objectives. The employment chapter involved 
no additional spending or obligatory measures but focused on information 
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sharing, pilot projects, and benchmarking, as agreed at the Luxembourg and 
Cardiff jobs summits. French Socialist ministers consistently stressed, if not 
exaggerated, the significance of EU policy developments in this area (Howarth 
2002). Since 2002, UMP governments have been considerably less activist in 
these areas. However, in the context of challenging opposition to the Draft Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe and then building support for the Reform 
Treaty, successive UMP governments placed considerable emphasis upon EU-
level social and employment policies as a buffer against the perceived liberalising 
bias of European integration. Prime Minister Raffarin listed the Draft Treaty’s 
provisions on employment and social policy and the goals of ‘employment and 
social progress’ as forming one of the most important reasons for voting yes in the 
June 2005 referendum (Le Monde, 5 March 2005). Opinion polls in the aftermath 
of the referendum no vote further demonstrated the importance of social policy 
considerations to French voters (Eurostat 2005). 
Modifying the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact has been another 
constant objective of French governments. President Chirac and the Juppé and 
Jospin governments very reluctantly accepted the creation of the Stability Pact to 
meet the demands of the Kohl government and to counter strong public and 
political opposition to EMU in Germany (Milesi 1998; Schor 1999). Following 
the November 2003 suspension of the EDP, the Raffarin Government presented 
reform proposals which sought a more flexible application of the Pact that 
would—officially—take into consideration the economic situation facing a 
participating member state and—in practice—allow more scope for political 
bargaining and thus margin of manoeuvre for French (and other) governments in 
the determination of excessive deficits The Raffarin Government wanted a 
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reformulated Pact to take into consideration deficit spending on public 
investment, contributions to the EU budget and defence—eliminating this for total 
public deficit considerations (Le Monde 3.12.04). Conveniently, this reform was 
defended in a report by the Council for Economic Analysis (18 November 2004). 
 
Conclusion 
On EMU institutional design and fiscal policy rules misfit has been long 
emphasized by both governments and the political opposition. It was tolerated 
because of the perception of real economic gain in the context of EMU, reinforced 
by relatively strong economic growth at start of Stage Three and the 
corresponding perception of ECB policy aligning with French economic 
preferences. Since 2002, UMP governments have blamed the strong euro for 
France’s commercial and current account deficits and low economic growth. Yet 
French public support for the euro remains consistently high. This high level of 
support is all the more remarkable given the persistently low public confidence in 
the state of the French economy and the effectiveness of the government’s 
economic policies (see Tables 4, 5 and 6). Yet the growing perception that EMU 
has had a negative impact on the French economy and individual citizens’ 
financial situation perhaps contributes to the generally weak economic policy 
reputation of French governments. In the years leading to 2002, one of the 
consistently positive public impressions of government managerial competence 
concerned the introduction of euro notes and coins (see Table 6) which thus 
suggests that EMU membership bolstered confidence in the government. 
However, in following years, the almost universal opinion that the introduction of 
euro notes and coins had significant inflationary effects (TNS Sofres, Le Monde 
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26.12.2006) no doubt contributed to negative impressions of government 
competence. 
There has been no retrenchment in France to date because of monetary 
integration. Strong growth from 1997 to 2001 made it politically easier for French 
governments to respect the deficit criterion of the Maastricht Treaty and Stability 
Pact. The low economic growth of the past half decade has increased the 
possibility of retrenchment but the unexpected flexibility of the EMU project has 
given recalcitrant UMP governments fiscal policy room to manoeuvre. 
Europeanization as transformation has been seen principally in terms of 
institutional reform—central bank independence—and budget management—
which has in turn reinforced the position of the Ministry of Finance in 
government policy making. With EMU participation allowing France more fiscal 
policy margin of manoeuvre, persistently high deficits and a rising debt load, it 
can be argued that EMU has contributed to inertia in public sector and social 
security reform. Yet, the fiscal policy rules of the Stability Pact remain a very 
important ostensible constraint that governments can use to justify reform. It is 
problematic to claim any clear impact of EMU on French state power. Debt itself 
has created greater constraints on state power but has also resulted in a new sense 
of urgency that has both encouraged French governments to initiate reform and 
forced a strategic engagement with labour unions and expert opinion to bring 
about that reform. 
EMU has contributed to the impressive productivity gains in the French 
private sector. This owes in part to the policy of competitive disinflation, the 
effects of which persisted after 1999 because comparatively low inflation means 
that real interest rates in France have been higher than in most other Euro Area 
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member states. The record level of profits of the ten largest French companies in 
2005—a year of sluggish French growth—was due to company sales and 
activities outwith France. Many French companies have responded to the 
gradualism of French governments on labour market reform by making full use of 
short-term and irregular contracts, just as many have taken full advantage of 
flexibility provisions in the 35-work week legislation to match hours worked with 
cyclical needs. Unemployment remains high in France due to the combination of 
productivity gains and the sluggishness of the state on labour market and public 
sector reform.  
French governments are engaged in the political management of a paradox 
of being constrained by an EMU project initially accepted to reduce constraint 
and of a project that has failed to meet economic expectations. French 
governments have insisted upon national margin of manoeuvre (in fiscal and other 
policies) and have engaged keenly in the scapegoating of the ECB. In doing so, 
however, they likely undermine the legitimacy of EMU and, in turn, their own 
reputation for governing competence to the extent that French governments 
cooperate fully in a maligned system. French governments have also sought to 
qualify the sound money policies of EMU through active state responses to the 
challenges of the single European market and globalization, in social, 
employment and interventionist industrial and infrastructural policies, at both the 
EU and domestic levels. Most French efforts to build EU economic governance 
have been frustrated not only by German and other member state opposition but 
also by contradictions within French policy, given the repeated refusal to accept 
binding European constraints. The very limited success of French governments in 
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their pursuit of these policies potentially further undermines their reputation for 
governing competence. 
 
